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Theorising State-Environment Relationships:  
Antinomies of Flexibility and Legitimacy 
 
“For the fate of Charles the First, hath only made kings more subtle – not more just” 
Thomas Paine, Common Sense (1776) 
 
 
Abstract: Scholarly work in geography has often fallen short of establishing the 
politicised connections between socioecological pressures, spatial dynamics and the 
changing patterns of the state apparatus. It is still necessary to better examine the 
failures of the responses to ecological problems in relation to the underlying politico-
ideological factors that constraint state interventions. Environmental governance has 
been particularly influenced by Hegelian political theories about flexibility and 
legitimacy. The persistence of problems largely derives from the idealism of the 
Hegelian constitutional plan, which have facilitated the advance of capitalism over the 
more-than-human spheres of socionature mediated and promoted by the contemporary 
state. 
 
State, Socionature and Human Geography  
 
This article will examine the socioecological repercussions of state action, the 
sociospatial consequences of environmental policies and the politics underpinning 
environmental statehood. Because of its many responsibilities and geographical 
interventions, the contemporary state has become a key socioecological (or 
socionatural, considering the hybrid ontology of the world, simultaneously ‘social’ 
and ‘natural’) player and its multiple socioecological interactions not only help to 
define state formations, but also contribute to either challenge or legitimise state 
institutions. The green agenda of the state is never inherently conservationist and not 
automatically endorsed by wider society, but the action of the state denotes values and 
assumptions that are integral to processes of political dispute, as ecological politics 
and the rationale of environmental management constitute, primarily, a struggle for 
the control of state’s functional capacity (Healy, 2012). As an environmental actor, 
the state is more internally fractured and contradictory than as a provider of welfare 
and national security (Robbins, 2008). Environmental statehood, by its turn, is more 
than just the administration of public matters over resources and ecosystems, but 
comprises the affirmation of specific ideologies and techniques of socioecological 
organisation. Material processes and political disputes represent important ‘geography 
makers’ that help to shape the state (Mann, 2009).  
Our starting point is the recognition of the state – particularly in the 
complexity of today’s world – as both a mediator and a locus of socionatural change 
and sociospatial transformation. Likewise, the apparatus of the state (considering not 
only its form, but function, language and political commitments) is more than simply 
a collection of agencies and regulatory instruments, but it comprises structures and 
strategies that reflect the balance of political power and the growth of social 
antagonisms (Lefebvre, 2008). This is evident, for example, in the case of economic 
development policies, large engineering constructions and the exploration of 
biodiversity and mineral reserves sponsored by the state. Regions and locations, as 
well as national territories, constitute important arenas for state action and state 
restructuring (Brenner, 2004). Moreover, although socioecological issues have meant 
a great deal for the reconfiguration of the contemporary state, there is still a need for 
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concerted scholarly work on the synergies between the responses to ecological 
problems and the underlying politico-ideological factors that influence the 
effectiveness of those same responses. This requires a reinterpretation of state theory 
in a way that posits ecological politics inside, and in relation to, statecraft and public 
policy-making. Such elaboration is ever more necessary nowadays taking into 
consideration that the command over nature, as famously announced by Francis 
Bacon, has mutated into sophisticated policies aimed not only at restraining 
environmental problems but at justifying and reinvigorating prevailing socioeconomic 
trends. 
Human geographers have certainly offered a significant contribution towards 
understanding the sociospatial basis of public policies and the involvement of the state 
in both the response and the creation of problems (particularly in capitalist societies). 
Geographers have reappraised the spatial attributes of the state associated with 
administrative action, institutional reforms and changes in discourse. For Kuus and 
Agnew (2008: 98), the state “has no ontological status apart from the practices that 
constitute its reality”, that is, it is “constituted out of the representations and practices 
that are associated with it”. In this case, the sovereignty of the state is constructed and 
reconstructed through both territorial and non-territorial practices operating in its 
name (rather than a pre-existing subjectivity and agency of the state), while state 
power is exercised territorially over ‘blocks of space’. Clark and Dear (1984) 
emphasise the sociospatial consequences of state action and how space has become 
part of the language of the state. These authors demonstrate that the state apparatus 
structures the sociospatial organisation of capitalist society, for instance through the 
regulation of commodity production and global markets, forces of economic 
concentration and decentralisation, transport and labour market policies, and core-
periphery integration. The semi-autonomy of the state is principally related to the 
state’s territorial centrality and its unique ability to provide territorialised forms of 
organisation (Mann, 1984). According to Taylor (1999), the way state practice and is 
influenced by politics is premised upon territoriality and issues of scale (from the 
household to the nation and the global arena).  
New areas of state intervention of interest to geographers have included the 
dilemmas posed by institutional strategies for environmental risks (Gandy, 1999), the 
framing of national natures through ideological and material processes (Whitehead et 
al., 2007), the developmental role and local mediations of state power (Silvey, 2010), 
the interplay between globalisation and localisation under neoliberalism (Peck, 2001), 
the promotion of novel spatial concepts (e.g. river basin management) and scalar 
connections (Sneddon and Fox, 2011), service provision and state reforms as part of a 
broader set of processes underway in affluent capitalist societies (Tickell, A. 2001) 
and the role of civil society and NGOs in the production and management of new 
territories (Brannstrom et al., 2004). However, the wider politico-ecological relevance 
of the capitalist state and the barriers for dealing with the conservation of the 
commons have not yet received enough theoretical and analytical treatment. For 
example, Clark and Dear (1984) fail to fully perceive the emerging importance of 
environmental issues for the reform, legitimacy and contestation of the capitalist state 
apparatus. This represents a missed opportunity, particularly for political geographers 
working on state reforms, neoliberal agendas and the failures of contemporary policy-
making. The result is a palpable gap in the comprehension of the achievements, 
failures and possibilities of state interventions, as much as in the actual 
socioecological embeddedness of state activity. The socioecological complexity of the 
state needs to be carefully examined taking into account its spatial, temporal and 
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political ‘signature’, resulting in macro and micro processes of conflict and 
cooperation around the valuation, access and command over socionature. The state 
connects different scales and spatial configurations of environmental issues and 
responds to environmental problems through various spatial approaches. The state is 
not a monolithic entity, but rather a ‘material condensation’ of forces and social 
relations, as famously described by Poulantzas (1978). Instead of something given in 
advance, there is a constant production of the state through every day practices that 
respond for the dynamic ‘geographies of stateness’ (Painter, 2006). 
There is, thus, a strong case for a rapprochement between work on state 
theory, sociospatial phenomena and ecological politics. This means addressing state 
interventions from a critical perspective and, ultimately, crafting a politico-ecological 
framework of the state. It is required dealing with two different forms of 
environmental politics, one more implicit (consisting of policies and practices that lie 
outside the arenas conventionally labelled as ‘environmental’ and where the state 
always played a crucial role) and the more explicit politics shaped by treaties, 
legislation and multiple forms of regulation (Conca, 1993). So far, most of the 
academic literature, by geographers and other scholars, has focused too much on the 
reformulation and implementation of state policies (Jones, 1998), state power (Allen 
and Cochrane, 2010) and the imposition of spatial ordering (Nuijten et al., 2012) but 
has paid less attention to ontological and ideological changes in the state produced by 
disputes over socioecological demands and impacts. It has been frequently neglected 
that the “control and management of nature has always been central to the realization 
and consolidation of state power” (Whitehead et al., 2007: 6). Even the examination 
of environmental politics – including the three main worldviews: individualism and 
free-market conservatism, biocentrism and deep ecology, and socialist and libertarian 
environmentalism (Dryzek and Lester, 1989) – rarely deals with the foundations of 
state dilemmas. Moreover, whereas there is extensive theorisation of concepts such as 
sustainable development (e.g. Dobson, 1998) and ecological modernisation (e.g. Mol 
and Sonnenfeld, 2000), there is only partial consideration of the politics that informs 
the socioecological responses by the state. 
There remains a limited conceptual understanding of the green commitments 
of the state in recent decades, which have been paradoxically related to a spatial 
disjuncture between the territorially-organised state and the spatiality of ecological 
problems, as well as with a tendency towards domination, disempowering and 
violence constantly perpetrated by the state (Paterson et al., 2006). For instance, 
Paehlke and Torgerson (2005) associate the administrative state with an 
environmental Leviathan and, while they ask for a more active involvement of social 
groups in state policies, they fail to address the underlying economic inequalities 
shaping the possibilities of state action in favour of deprived groups. Eckersley (1992, 
2004) insists on the importance of an ecocentric approach supporting deliberative 
democracy to usher a solution to the ecological crisis, but she too easily associates 
critical environmental politics (e.g. ecosocialism) with anthropocentrism and, as a 
result, misses the opportunity to connect the political agency of the working class with 
the creativity of the environmentalist movement. What is more, Bernstein (2001) 
identifies as causes of the environmental problems the misbehaviour of individuals or 
the lack of a proper economic treatment of ecological processes, while Hayward 
(1998) argues that political theory needs to deal with the opportunities available for 
civil society to change policy-making and Conca (2006) examines the struggles for 
the institutionalisation of the ‘nonstate’ through elusive quests for integration and 
public participation. These last authors stop short of establishing the deeper 
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connections between socioecological pressures, class-based disputes and the changing 
patterns of the state. 
The aim here is to address the core complexity of the politicised ecologies 
affected by the intervention of the contemporary state, which is a process of major 
geographical relevance. This article will indicate how some of the main challenges 
affecting contemporary environmental policy-making reflect prominent debates about 
the configuration and social responsibilities of the state held almost two hundred years 
ago at the dawn of industrial capitalism. Now, as much as then, the emergence and 
persistence of socioecological disputes between groups and countries are concentrated 
in and largely reworked through the intervention, and biases, of the state. With the 
consolidation of the capitalist society, one of the main tasks of the state is the 
naturalisation and maximisation of anti-commons institutions, as well as the 
administration of the socioecological impacts of relations of production. Those 
responses have achieved a level of unprecedented sophistication in recent years under 
the agenda of environmental governance. The achievements and limitations of today’s 
environmental statehood can be particularly explained with a Marxist critique of the 
theories of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and his long legacy in terms of idealising 
and legitimising a flexible, but intrinsically conservative, state rationality. The 
Hegelian theory of the state entails a flexible, adaptive configuration that provides the 
political legitimacy and regulatory elasticity associated with contemporary 
environmental policy-making. It should be noted that the readings of Hegel’s political 
elaboration in the Anglo-American world have been influenced by idealist philosophy 
since the beginning of the 20th Century, but it lost its appeal during the period of 
authoritarianism and Keynesian economics. Only when the welfare-developmentalist 
state started to show its insurmountable contradictions that Hegelian politics, even 
implicitly, started to make sense again. Such multilevel and multidimensional 
complexity requires a robust theorisation able to unpack the politicised connections 
between state, space and the production of socionature. In order to discuss that, it is 
first required to situate our discussion in the wider context of the critical theories of 
the state, as discussed next. 
 
The Marxist Perspective(s): Problems and Problematization 
  
Most political science approaches recognise today three main theories of the 
modern state, namely, Pluralist, Elitist (or Managerialist) and Marxist interpretations. 
While Pluralism emphasises the centrality of social groups and political parties 
interacting and being represented by the state, Elitism underscores the asymmetries of 
power in society and the critical influence of political elites on state action. It is not 
possible here to revisit in detail those two interpretations (see Alford and Friedland, 
1985; Hay, 2006; Cudworth et al., 2007), but it is central to our argument to 
demonstrate that ecology state-environment theorisation can particularly benefit from 
a Marxist perspective of the totality of spatial relations between state, economy and 
socionature. The intervention of the state in the environmental arena is an integral 
feature of the expansion of capitalism and of the intensification of socioecological 
contradictions. Different than in previous socioeconomic formations, the capitalist 
management of socionature entails more than the procurement of raw materials and 
territorial power, as changes in the physical and symbolic configuration of nature 
were brought to the centre of capital accumulation. The Marxist contribution is 
relevant to comprehend that capitalism is ultimately a socioeconomic system based on 
the double, interrelated exploitation of labour power and of (the rest of) socionature. 
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In that sense, the separation of the labourer from the means of production mirrors the 
alienation of individuals from their socionatural condition. 
Even though the association between capitalism and the state varies from 
country to country (Badie and Birnbaum, 1983; Wood, 2002), contemporary 
environmental questions are, essentially, located in the possibilities and limitations of 
capitalist relations of production and reproduction overseen, and affected, by the state. 
Considering that the broader reproduction of capitalism is a main sphere of state 
responsibility (Fine and Harris, 1979), a key dilemma of the contemporary state is 
exactly the need to exercise leadership on behalf of the wider society and 
simultaneously defend the interests of the stronger politico-economic groups. Changes 
in the environmental agenda are also derived from the need to legitimise state action 
and validate production and consumption activities. Contemporary environmental 
problems are not only derived from the failures of the state to arbitrate contradictory 
demands, but it is the result of the convergence of hegemonic interests around the 
organisation and running of the state. Environmental statehood constitutes an 
ensemble of organisations and institutions that emerged in the Western countries and 
then expanded to most of the world, especially through the intervention of the 
internationalised state and multilateral agencies such as UNEP, World Bank and FAO 
(Ioris, 2012a). It is important also to examine how relations and processes materialise 
on the ground and are negotiated on everyday basis, given that individuals not only 
suffer but are able to react, reinvent and often benefit, at least to some extent, from 
mainstream environmental policies. Consequently, a class-based perspective can 
provide a systemic and integrated investigation of the origins of environmental 
problems and problematize the failure of prevailing solutions, whilst at the same time 
address structural differences, environmental injustices and sociospatial exclusion 
happening through politicised socionatural interactions. That is because the geography 
of the state is an important part of the advance of capitalism over the human and, 
increasingly, the more-than-human spheres of socionature. 
Although Marx only left a fragmented theory of the state, he understood it as 
the expression of social balance of power (but with a degree of relative autonomy), as 
much as the effect of state forms and activities on the production and realisation of 
value (Ollman, 2003). As demonstrated by Marx (1913), dominant class politics is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure state reproduction of class relations, but the 
connections between state and class politics (including sub-sections of classes) are 
both contingent and non-linear. Economic issues are certainly prominent and trigger 
state action in multiple and unexpected ways, or, as put by Poggi (1978), under 
capitalism the economy subordinates and reduces the importance of other factors. 
Marx’s attack on the bourgeois state was a humanist, radically democratic proposition 
to release civil society from the inherent contradiction of an economy that keeps 
evolving through the strategic connections between state, hegemonic classes and class 
fragments (see Marx and Engels, 1974). Following that initial Marxian elaboration, 
there has been a long debate about the interconnection between the economic and the 
political realms of state interventions, that is, the action of the state not only in 
relation to the interests of the capitalist class but also in terms of the need to secure 
the cohesion of society as a whole (Clarke, 1991). The ‘state question’ has occupied a 
prominent position in Marxist discussions, which started with Engels (1972) and his 
contention that the state as a necessary evil for the exploitation of labour, Lenin’s 
(1932) claim that the bourgeois state must be smashed and replaced by a proletarian 
government and Gramsci’s (1971) theory of the state based on force and consent.  
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The crisis of the welfare regime and the political unrest in the late 1960s 
provided an opportunity for Marxist authors to renew the scrutiny of the state (Jessop, 
1977). More literal readings of Marx’s and Engel’s texts, such as by Mandel (1969), 
tried to situate the state as the product of class conflicts and operates on behalf of the 
ruling class, while other interpretations, such as the ‘capital logic’ school, attempted 
to derive the general form of the state from the capitalist mode of production 
(Holloway and Picciotto, 1978) and assert that the state is the ‘ideal collective 
capitalist’ that operates independently of the actions of individual capitalists (Altvater, 
1973). Because of the perceived ahistoricism of those claims, the ‘regulationist’ 
school tried to portray the state as the manager that compensates for the crisis between 
production and consumption (Aglietta, 1979), whereas Offe (1984) argued that the 
main problem with the welfare state was the contradiction between private ownership 
of industry and socialisation of production. The most notorious positions of this 
period were advanced by Miliband (1969), who insisted that the institutions 
comprising the state (such as parliament, government, policy and the judiciary) are 
colonised and primarily represent the capitalist class (that is, the state has significant 
power by it is a theoretical abstraction on behalf of the bourgeoisie), and by 
Poulantzas (1967), who disagreed by saying that capitalist power permeates the state 
in a more systematic manner and that connects the structures of society and the state. 
Clark and Dear (1984) criticise both Poulantzas, Miliband and others for being 
too society-centred (i.e. the nature of the state deriving from the logic of capitalism 
itself) and for neglecting the state’s relative autonomy and power, while Jessop (1982) 
ventures to find a middle ground (although closer to Poulantzas) with his strategic-
relational approach that depicts the state as an institutional ensemble of power centres 
that does not exist in isolation of wider disputes, but its authority conforms with 
political economy and is embedded in social relations. A more general criticism is that 
state theory is still a major ‘hole’ in the Marxist literature, particularly because of the 
tendency to either insist on the reification of the state (Abrams, 1988) or abandon 
historico-materialist readings of the state to fall back into liberal or conservative legal 
theories (Macnair, 2006). Therefore, a key task for Marxist authors has been to move 
away from the structuralist-functionalist boundaries of the recent debate (Clarke, 
1991) and produce a more robust theorisation of the tacit separation of the state from 
the capitalist class and its dealings with the other class-based demands (including 
socioecological issues), as much as provide a better understanding of the constraints 
of state interventions and of its striving to foster unity in a fragmented society. There 
is still an evident need for Marxists, geographers in particular, to examine the 
rationality, appearance and function of the state and how the production of 
environmental statehood has affected state discourse, action and legitimacy.  
One main contribution of Marxist authors has been the separation between 
appearance and reality, which is required to understand the fetishized, mystified form 
of the class content that permeates the state (Wells, 1981). The state can then be 
appreciated in its permanent, often contradictory, interplay with society and the rest of 
nature, as much as any examination of the state needs to encompass the broader, 
highly politicised evolution of the socionatural world (Ioris, 2012b). As a result, three 
main geographical points seem to immediately require further investigation, namely, 
the organisation and configuration of the state, the motivations and rationality of 
environmental responses, and the possibilities and limitations of state interventions. 
First, the formation of a dedicated nucleus of environmental policy and regulation 
within the state apparatus, especially since the 1970s, was both a reaction to civil 
society pressures and the complaints of groups more directly impacted by 
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environmental degradation and also a response to inter-capitalist tensions and rising 
production costs due to ecological disruption and artificially created scarcities (e.g. 
scarcity of land, water and biodiversity products). Nonetheless, even with its growing 
complexity, the environmental branches of the state are normally instigated by foreign 
organisations and devoid of real power to face up to politico-economic hegemonic 
pressures (vis-à-vis the failure of public transport policies against the use of the 
private car). The contradictions between various state policies mean that, in practice, 
the environmental agencies of the state are typically relegated to only a secondary 
level of importance. 
Second, the main motivation of the state to intervene in environmental matters 
is to contain socioecological disputes overflowing into class-based conflicts. 
Environmental policies and legislation serve, first and foremost, to systematise the 
access and ownership of parts of socionature that have economic or political 
relevance, as well as reduce production costs and uncertainties. Environmental 
responses by the state are also required because of the non coincidence in time and 
space of the causes of environmental degradation and the actual realisation of those 
impacts (i.e. a time-lag and space-lag phenomenon). It means that the protection of 
nature is only an incidental objective and the primary reason of state action in 
environmental matters is an anti-commons requirement of capitalist production, which 
is conveyed through the management and circumstantial preservation of the same 
commons. At the same time, although environmental statehood is primarily concerned 
with the amelioration of existing capitalist conditions, the specific interventions of the 
state can sometimes temporarily contradict that aim. Marx (1981) aptly identifies 
moments when interactions among the capitalist class lead to the dissociation between 
capital ownership and profit generation (i.e. the expansion of finance capital), which 
can cause monopoly problems and require state intervention. The management of 
environmental issues has comparable similarities, in the sense that it is also a situation 
that capital’s drive for profit has to be contained, but as a measure to re-establish more 
general accumulation opportunities. It is “the abolition of the capitalist mode of 
production within the capitalist mode of production itself” a “point of transition” to 
new forms of production (Marx, 1981: 569). 
Third, environmental statehood is permanently reformulated and frequently 
undermined because of the intrinsic limitations of the state and the specific properties 
of environmental questions, which are unevenly distributed in space, unpredictably 
connected in time and scale, and associated with high levels of urgency and 
uncertainty. Many of the failures of public policies and environmental regulation 
originate not in the political commitments of the state, but derive from the 
incompetence to coordinate its own interventions (which may answer many of the 
attacks made on the Marxist theory of the state by van den Berg, 2003). Those issues 
have represented major challenges for the environmental ability of the Westphalian 
state. Given the global basis of environmental issues, a state may be responding not 
only to the hegemonic pressures of the national capitalist class, but also to fractions of 
classes in foreign countries and opposition groups in those same countries. As pointed 
out by Poulantzas (1967: 65), the Marxist conception of politics “enables us to explain 
the possibility of social formations in which there are ‘disjunctions’ between the class 
whose mode of production ultimately imposes its dominant political role on the one 
hand and the objective structures of the state on the other. (...) This will lead us to the 
following conclusion: there may be sizeable disjunctions between the politically 
dominant class and the objective structures of the State.” 
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The above three points help to start unveiling the environmental dimension of 
the contemporary state, in particular the specific features of the responses to 
environmental problems formulated under the aegis of ‘governance’ (instead of 
simply government). Governance, instead of conventional government, is described as 
the pursuit of more flexible strategies and mechanisms of public administration to 
accomplish policy goals, realise values and manage environmental risks and impacts. 
This is expected to be achieved through the re-regulation of conservation and of the 
use of natural resources, which amalgamate state-oriented and market-oriented 
approaches (Ioris, 2010). The interpretation of governance often makes use of the 
Foucauldian notion of governmentality and the bio-power of the state through a 
plurality of interventions in health, hygiene and environmental issues. Power is seen 
dispersed throughout society and is a positive force in the creation and change of 
behaviour (Foucault, 1977), which in the environmental arena has led to the formation 
of new expert knowledge, social practices, regulatory approaches and subjectivities 
(Agrawal, 2005). However, the analysis informed by Foucault is of little assistance to 
understand state action and failures, given that it essentially diverts the attention away 
from the state. A more accurate assessment of the peculiarities of environmental 
governance in the capitalist world should focus on sociopolitical relations that 
permeate and are encouraged by the state, instead of restricting the analysis to 
explanations that tends to minimise the socioecological centrality of the state as both a 
mediator and a champion of the demands of groups, classes and class-fractions. 
As already mentioned above, the disagreement between Hegel and Marx, 
where the first strived to perfect the emerging state of industrial capitalism and the 
second called for the withering away of the (capitalist) state, has huge, although 
somehow surprising, relevance nowadays. The tortuous evolution of environmental 
statehood has reproduced, in a small and sectoral scale, the clashes between those two 
main thinkers of the nascent capitalist world mainly because the grave environmental 
contradictions of modern-day capitalism, with all the geographical and historical 
differences, have parallels with the socioeconomic and political challenges of the 
early 19th Century. Different than Hegel (2008), Marx rejected the view that the state 
could be described as an all-encompassing political community functioning according 
to an ethical appeal and acting as the fulfilment of reason. In the preface to A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx (1975) shows how Hegel, 
through a skilful handling of ethics and dialectics, ultimately reduced civil society to 
economic society. That resembles the reduction of the complexity of ecosystems to 
the narrow language of money and the techno-bureaucracy of computer models that 
characterise today’s prevailing approaches to environmental regulation and 
management. Hegelian ideals have actually inspired the neopragmatism of ecological 
modernisation (Davidson, 2012), whose “normalisation of practices tends to obscure 
their philosophical premises and the separation of theory from practise, finance from 
politics, policy from implementation” (Irwin, 2007: 648). Hegelianism is largely 
centred on the spreading of universalisms among particularities and a subtle 
legitimacy through the homogenisation of politics and the promotion of reason. In the 
next section, the Hegelian foundations of political reforms and their impact on 
environmental governance will be further analysed. 
 
Questioning the Basis of Contemporary Environmental Statehood 
 
The continuities and divergences between Marx and Hegel are complex and 
have been the object of an interminable debate for more than a century. To be sure, 
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most of Marx’s analysis of the Hegelian political thinking was very selective and 
done early in his life. The young Marx was a member of the group of Left-Hegelians 
and was influenced by the humanism of some of its key members, such as Bauer and 
Feuerbach. The group debated over Prussian politics, religion and sociology, 
criticised the idealisation of the state by the old Hegelians and attacked Hegel himself 
for failing to deal with what they called ‘the living man’, the sensuous person who 
actually thinks, feels and creates his/her own existence over any generalisation. The 
young Hegelians strongly rejected that the state could claim its legitimacy on religious 
grounds, because the corruption and despotism of the state was actually considered 
the embodiment of religion. Involved in these discussions, Marx increasingly 
radicalised his political positions, rejected Hegelian idealism and Left-Hegelianism, 
and shifted his criticism away from religion and towards private property and the 
ownership of capital (Berlin, 1978). If Hegel discarded the notion of social contract of 
Rousseau and Kant in favour of a constitutional formula based on the rational state, as 
the spiritualised form of the ‘Idea’ (Chaskiel, 2005), in his Critique of Hegel’s 
‘Philosophy of Right’ Marx (1970) rebuffed Hegel’s argument that reality was a 
predicate of the Idea, the actual subject of historical development. 
The influence of Hegel on Marx has been a matter of fierce scholarly debate 
and has given room to many interpretations. It is clear that if Marx remained always a 
Hegelian (at least in terms of his analytical and interpretative methods), he tried to 
bring politics to the centre of social and economic analyses and set his assessment of 
the state on the course of transformative revolution and comprehensive social and 
spatial inclusion. What is more important is that Marx’s long and hard attempt to 
overcome the Hegelian mystification of the state and his effort to move beyond 
Hegel’s immanence-transcendence approach have close parallels with the removal of 
the alienated basis of environmental governance proposed in the present essay. The 
main goal of the contemporary governance agenda is the transition from rigid, 
monothematic environmental regulation into more responsive interventions, which 
betray the influence of Hegelian political thinking. The centralised and bureaucratic 
style of the environmental management policies of the previous Keynesian state was 
criticised for being ineffective, expensive and too divisive. That led to the emergence 
of new forms of environmental negotiation at the national and international levels 
(Hurrell, 1994). Instead of approaches centred on absolute limits to economic 
development and population growth (Daly, 1973; Ehrlich, 1968; Meadows et al., 
1974), there was a gradual shift towards more flexible public policies. It has 
represented an important chapter of the broader strategies attempting to redraw the 
public-private divide (Bernstein, 2001). 
The institutionalisation of sustainable development faced other related 
obstacles, in particular the inadequate grasp of the triangular relationship between 
environmental problems, globalisation and state dynamics (Park et al., 2008). 
However, what has not been adequately recognised yet is that the flexibility and 
legitimacy required for this conservative institutional renovation need to be situated in 
the wider perspective of Western political thought under the influence of the Hegelian 
theory of the state. Although calls for governance and sustainable development 
brought a promise of improved environmental statehood, in practice most 
controversial questions were pushed into the background in favour of pragmatic, 
market-based approaches that did not question the dominant ideology of ecological 
modernisation (Brand, 2010). Informed by the Hegelian thinking, today’s 
environmental statehood can combine macro and micro scales of power control with 
subtle forms of justification and policy enforcement. Beyond the liberalism of Locke, 
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the liberal-utilitarianism of Mill and Bentham, and the bureaucratic-rationalisation of 
Weber, the political and moral claims of Hegel provided, although in most cases 
indirectly, the intellectual tools for the adoption of the agenda of environmental 
governance. The connections between dynamic scales of interaction action remain a 
main expression of state influence, particularly through the dissolution of the previous 
Fordist sociospatial fix (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). 
Hegel had a highly sophisticated and cunning design for the state, in the sense 
that he was averse to frenzied subjectivities and defended an individuality that was 
meant to be subsumed into corporations and estates, that is, the individual should be 
fused with the universality of the community (Levine, 2009). He didn’t see the state 
as primarily the safeguard of people’s self-interest, but as the guardian of a moral life 
and universal altruism (Avineri, 1972). Along those lines, he claimed to resolve the 
fundamental tension between the public and private through a ‘mediation of the will’ 
between the family, civil society and the state. In effect, Hegel’s state system only 
makes sense as the human approximation of the perfect political model, that is, the 
concept of a moral state to be pursued through ethical life. According to Hegel, the 
whole ethical basis of the state emanates from the Idea, the spirit, the absolute 
essence. Hegel indicated that the ultimate endeavour was to “apprehend and present 
the state as something inherently rational” (Hegel, 2008: 15). As a result, Hegel 
emphasised the coincidence between world history and rationality that places the state 
as the guarantor of systematic reason. The realisation (‘actualisation’, in the Hegelian 
terminology) of reason is the fundamental purpose of the state, as the conveyor of the 
perfect social order and the conciliator of conflicts of interest. For Hegel, because the 
state is seen as ‘inherently rational’, it can naturally become the main promoter and 
defender of reason and, therefore, a supposedly legitimate force in the course of 
historical change.  
Probably the most influential feature of Hegel’s political argument is exactly 
the adaptive configuration of the state over and above the bare affirmation of power 
and the most immediate demands of the stronger (propertied) social groups. The 
Hegelian state “is a dynamic institution that sees Right developing as determinate 
action, within the context of society bringing back every social action to the total 
determinations of the given rational order” (Negri, 2011: 38). Hegel “tries to find a 
place in the State both for individual liberty and for strong government”, that is, the 
state is effective when it allows for self-subsistent individuality (Knox, 1970: 25). In 
this way, Hegel provided the necessary political legitimacy and regulatory flexibility 
needed to improve the situation in Prussia still largely characterised by 
authoritarianism and political centralisation. His political thinking evolved in the 
dialectical interplay between universal and particular, finite and infinite, state 
authority and personal initiative. Hegel’s thoughts advanced a conceptual 
rationalisation that was able to reconcile renovation and permanence, rupture and 
legitimacy, democratic inclusion and (from the perspective of those in control) needed 
political seclusion. In particular, Hegel’s account of statecraft was superior to other 
comparable theories that described the state above society or subsumed in economic 
transactions. For instance, Weber’s model of ethical rationalisation and institutional 
embodiment of consciousness is excessively rigid to demonstrate, in a convincing 
way, the interplay between state, economy and the rest of socionature.  
Hegel was certainly an acute observer of the problems and demands of public 
administration and its hybrid attempts to accommodate the needs of the declining 
aristocracy and the demands of the emerging, still weak bourgeoisie. His relation with 
the Prussian State was not one of easy support or justification of an extant political 
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regime, but Hegel used it as an invitation to reform the state in accordance with 
principles at work (in varying degrees) within the existing states (Knox, 1970). 
Different than Fichte (who worked approximately in the same period and saw state 
functions solely to protect the rights of persons), the Hegelian state is a congregation 
of estates and corporations – which represent different social sectors – that must 
operate primarily as a community. The state should become a sophisticated juncture 
of normative, social and economic driving-forces (Hegel, 1964). Consequently, Hegel 
anticipated some elements of the constitutional welfarian state in the middle of the 
last century (Avineri, 1972; Levine, 2009), but at the same time he also provided 
ammunition for the liberalising experience of the last decades of the 20th Century 
when national parliaments have lost power and delegated law-making responsibilities 
to the executive branches of the state and to private enterprises (Trotta, 2009). 
Although the neoliberal state is sometimes related to the Kantian claim that the only 
innate human right is freedom, in effect neoliberalism requires a careful combination 
of market freedom, economic intensification and political legitimisation that also 
closely follows Hegelian political thinking. That is because Kant (1991), and other 
18th Century philosophers, elaborated a more abstract conception of freedom and 
liberal politics based on the separation between ‘is’ and ‘ought to be’ but Hegel went 
a step further to argue for a concrete realisation of potentiality in history, for bringing 
the ideal conceptualisation into actual social interaction. 
Before neoliberalism and the globalised society at turn of the 21st Century 
(when the state is now tested to the limit) there was no real opportunity to fully adopt 
the Hegelian state model based on the legitimisation of enlightened bourgeois values. 
It was the European Union project, particularly after the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, that 
offered the best prospect for the realisation (actualisation) of the Hegelian 
constitutionalism, especially in the realm of environmental regulation and 
management. The 1972 Paris meeting of the European Council set the state for a 
series of policy adjustments and additional legislation focused on environmental 
issues, but it was in the 1980s that there was growing emphasis on integrated 
management and pollution prevention; in the 1990s most trade barriers between 
European countries were removed, including a number of them related to the 
environment (Liefferink, 1996). In all that, it is possible to find elements of 
Hegelianism, especially in the search for legitimacy and flexibility. In that process, 
governance, instead of conventional government, took centre stage as the pursuit of 
more flexible strategies and mechanisms of public administration that facilitate the 
accomplishment of socioecological goals, the realisation of values and the 
management of environmental risks and impacts (OECD, 2011). Environmental 
policies became increasingly characterised by a more flexible association between 
market demands and environmental protection. For example, climate change policies 
shifted from a focus on charges and licences to the centrality of carbon markets and 
related schemes (such as REDD). Nonetheless, the grand plans for the formation 
rational, ethical state have been fundamentally contained by the very reasoning of the 
Hegelian political thinking and his defence of state’s supreme authority and the 
associated centrality of private economic property. 
It is in this context that Marxist ecology can be of great relevance as a tool to 
understand the limited advances and major contradictions of mainstream responses to 
environmental issues. The Hegelian thinking that underpins environmental 
governance, particularly in the European Union, constitutes an attempt to preserve 
and modernise the bourgeois state in the face of widespread socionatural tensions. 
Likewise, the unsustainability of the mainstream sustainability platforms (i.e. the 
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disjuncture between the environmental discourse and the socioeconomic practice of 
the state and its main allies) can be explained, first of all, by the Hegelian mistaken 
identity between the real and the rational (i.e. the real is rational by definition). The 
naturalisation of environmental problems by the techno-bureaucratic systems of the 
modern-day state ends up in the endorsement of responses that are considered rational 
in advance, despite their flagrant irrationality (as in the case of greenhouse gas 
emission reductions and carbon markets, which nonetheless preserve the reliance of 
contemporary society on fossil fuels and non-renewable sources of energy). As Marx 
(1970) already showed, Hegel multiplied antinomies and inconsistencies all over the 
text of the Philosophy of Right with an argument that combines sophisms and 
speculation. Following the Hegelian claim for rational realism, the contemporary state 
is the historical necessity of capitalist relations, but it is also predicated upon those 
same relations and the myriad of socionatural impacts thus produced. Hegel’s 
argument in favour of economic inequalities as the basis of social progress provides 
contradictory justification for economic growth at the expense of environmental 
concerns. Hegel had an aprioristic configuration of the state as an idealised entity 
shaped by reason, while Marx tried – admittedly, with only partial success – to 
develop a materialist understanding of the political agency that shapes the state.  
Another negative influence of Hegel’s political framework on environmental 
governance was the reduction of social and political differences to the ‘common’ 
language of money, which was explicitly recommended by Hegel as a mechanism that 
could strategically forge social collaboration (see Hegel, 2008: 285). Such claim has 
major relevance nowadays in terms of the monetary quantification of nature and the 
recognition of private property that are promoted as central priorities by 
environmental economists. For Hegel, the individual and the state are interconnected 
and interdependent, but this relationship can only happen if the rule of law preserves 
the existing institutions of private property and the hierarchisation of political life 
(Hegel in Realphilosophie, quoted in Avineri, 1973). Hegel dismissed the separation 
of powers proposed by Montesquieu in favour of a unitary, constitutional monarchy 
reining over (atomised) citizens, as the enforcement of universal principles over 
particular individuals. Marx, on the contrary, situates the transformation of the state in 
a much more radical trajectory and singled out one class, the proletariat, as the 
effective transformer of the state, further than the social contract of Kant and the 
universalism of the state of Hegel. According to Marx, the capitalist, Hegelian state 
becomes the perpetuator of alienation also because of its role in enforcing the priority 
of exchange value over use value. That seems to confirm the shrewd influence of 
Hegel on the European state system: instead “of having subjects objectifying 
themselves in public affairs Hegel has public affairs becoming the subjects” (Marx, 
1970: 62).  
The Hegelian state model may be an improvement when compared with 
previous state configurations, but its rationale has also the unhelpful effect of 
containing the possibilities of real democracy. According to Hegel, the state is 
separated from and emerges out of society, as something dialectically connected with 
the individual. In the interpretation of Reyburn (1921: 235), the “restraints of public 
life are the articulations which the [Hegelian] state requires in order to attain its 
proper unity and organization, and the citizen who is conscious of his identity with the 
state is made free by them.” Hegel put aside the need of explicit democracy and social 
equality, because it is not individual that needs to be represented in the state but 
his/her interests that can be presumed, captured through rational thinking. Hegel also 
accepted plural categories of political difference, but only to the extent that pluralism 
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observed pre-established boundaries and acquiesced to the narrow space of 
conventional politics. He developed a complex and highly sophisticated 
conceptualisation of the state and its metabolism with civil society (the economic 
realm) and family (the personal realm), but that process left what Plant (1973: 196) 
calls some “disruptive ambiguities which surrounds Hegel’s philosophy of politics”. 
As pointed out by Lefebvre (2009: 84), the Hegelian state “does not arbitrate 
conflicts, it moderates them by keeping them within the limits of the established 
order.” 
The failures of the official responses to collective problems serve to expose 
the socioecological inadequacies of calls for environmental governance and should 
provoke a rethinking of contemporary state formations informed by Hegelian political 
thinking. Instead of the claims made by neo-Hegelians (e.g. Žižek, 2011), according 
to Hegel the individual is dialectically incorporated (sublated) in the state, but only 
with the firm containment of his/her needs and within the pre-conceived boundaries of 
the ‘rational’, bourgeois state. On the one hand, the state is proclaimed the 
manifestation of an ethical Idea, the actualisation of freedom; on the other hand the 
supreme duty of the individual is to become a subordinate member of the state. The 
result is not simply a harmonic separation between private and public life, as claimed 
by Hegel, but a frontal antagonism between the functions of the state (predicated as 
right in advance, as the state brings freedom and reason) and the actuality of private 
life (in Hegelian terms, logically containing a lower level of rationality). For Hegel, as 
much as for Plato, plain democracy leads to lawlessness, anarchy and departure from 
the ideal state, eventually paving the road for the emergence of tyrannies. The 
individual retains his/her ‘free will’ and self-consciousness, but at the cost of having 
to conform to a preordained plan of public affairs. This type of dialectics if 
profoundly perverse, because it starts from the Idea (as truth) and the individual is 
only later given the opportunity, or accomplished the necessity, to be incorporated 
(sublated) in the Idea.  In providing the justification for a system that is based on the 
double exploitation of society and the rest of nature, the soft-violence of the Hegelian 
state is the maximisation or potentialisation of violence.  
It was in the famous article On the Jewish Question that Marx (1975) 
presented a compelling alternative to the Hegelian mystification of the state. In this 
analysis of the prospects of religious freedom, Marx subverted the conventional 
argument about political and religious emancipation. In his view, the political 
emancipation of the religious person requires, first of all, the emancipation of the state 
from religion. In other words, it was not enough to secure additional political rights 
“within the prevailing scheme of things”, especially contained by private property 
relations and the modern state (Marx, 1975: 221). On the contrary, in order to become 
a genuine social being (instead of only an abstract citizen), the individual needs to 
secure his/her human emancipation, which depends on overcoming the separation of 
the individual from social forces. There is a fundamental message here, which can be 
applied to explain the fundamental environmental contradictions of the modern state. 
For Marx, the perfect Christian state is exactly the atheist form of state (as the United 
States), which grants religious freedom as artefact to paradoxically promote and 
consolidate a highly religious society. This is a process of partial, mystified 
emancipation in which the state become free by the individual remains subjugated. 
Similarly now, the green agenda of the state can only be effective through the 
recognition of the politicised basis of socioecological problems. Some geographers, 
such as Mcguirk and O'Neill (2012), have highlighted the contested terrain of the state 
and the possibility of progressive policies in partnership with the state. Nonetheless, 
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without significant transformations of the state apparatus, those potential 
improvements would only be localised, fragmented and almost irrelevant (as in the 
case of current energy saving and waste recycling policies in Britain). Instead of a 
civil society constituted by objectified citizenship and top-down forms of consensus 
(which is nowadays reinforced by mass-consumption lifestyles and alienated political 
consciousness), a critical political ecology should aspire to see a management of 
public affairs that is not separated from the people, no longer a limit to their freedom.   
 
Conclusions: Overcoming the Hegelianism of Environmental Governance 
 
Starting in the Western countries, more responsive policy-making machineries 
were instituted by most national governments since the 1970s, which included an 
extensive review of environmental legislation and of the agencies responsible for 
monitoring and enforcement of regulatory codes. Following wider economic and 
political commitments, environmental policies and regulation have been essentially 
reformist (i.e. responses are formulated after the process of environmental disruption 
is in place) and politically conservative (i.e. to satisfy mainly the demands of the 
stronger social groups and the legitimacy needs of the state apparatus itself). The best 
expression of the selective basis of mainstream responses has been the emphasis on 
environmental governance, which replaced the previous forms of command-and-
control of the welfare-developmentalist state with calls for public engagement, 
responsible behaviour and the moral authority of an enlightened politics. The 
ambiguous, but highly instrumental agenda of environmental governance betrays the 
influence of Hegelian political philosophy, in the sense that a new generation of 
environmental regulation – portrayed as the expression of wisdom, higher democracy 
and scientific aptness – was superimposed over a socionatural reality with growing 
environmental impacts and associated conflicts. 
Though the Marxian analysis of the Hegelian philosophy of right (Marx, 1970) 
was actually never intended for publication, the fundamental points then made by 
Marx – the mystification of the state and the twist between subject and predicate by 
Hegel – have stood the test of time. The Hegelian political model is fundamentally 
based on the dualism ‘civil society-political state’, which replaced the Hobbesian 
tension between nature and society (Bobbio and Bovero, 1979). Both Hegel and Marx 
believed in the superiority of the collective dimension over the individualism of 
natural law (giusnaturalismo), although for Hegel the higher political structure of 
contemporary society has a positive meaning and for Marx social superstructure has 
the opposite sense. The main problems identified by Marx in the Hegelian theory, 
namely the atomism of civil society, idealism of state rationality and the cunning of 
administrative flexibility actually represent some of the most evident limitations of 
the state nowadays. The contradictions of environmental governance, such as in the 
European Union, can be better appreciated with the help of Marx’s reading of the 
Hegelian idealisation of the state: it is the paradox of achieving all and nothing at the 
same time. The application of detailed science, parliamentary law-making and 
systematic public consultation may give the impression that the state is effectively 
moving towards higher levels of sustainability and ecological citizenship. However, 
the environmental action of the contemporary state is in effect shrouded in 
mystification, elitism and manipulation of public affairs for the benefit of those 
previously in control of the state. Despite the ingeniousness of the Hegelian model, 
the responsive capacity of conventional environmental regulation is also increasing 
showing signs of inadequacy and exhaustion.  
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The fundamental antinomies of flexibility and legitimacy of contemporary 
environmental policies need to be situated in this wider politico-ecological debate 
about the reform of the state. The key ontological and political question is less how 
the state deals with the environmental policies and strategies per se, but what its 
ultimate commitments are and how it works to reinforce or eliminate processes of 
exclusion and exploitation. As observed by Marx (1975), it is the manner of 
emancipation that needs to be criticised, given that the state can liberate itself without 
people being set free. Furthermore, the fundamental distortions of conservative 
democracy “must be looked for in the nature of the state itself” (Marx, 1975: 217). 
This requires sustained and radical transformations in small, specific state practices 
and also in wider commitments and interventions of the state. What is more, the 
renewal of existing state formations should happen both from the outside and from the 
inside of the state. The transcendence of the dualism between structure and agency of 
the state requires the avoidance of nature-society dualisms, which are in large part 
promoted and reinforced by the state itself. In the end, those multiple answers to 
socionatural disputes around the state should become a main unifying catalyst that 
brings together sociopolitical emancipation and a just, ecologically viable, society. 
 
Bibliography  
 
Abrams, P. 1988: Notes on the difficulty of studying the state. Journal of Historical 
Sociology 1, 58-89. 
Aglietta, M. 1979: A theory of capitalist regulation: The US Approach. London: 
Verso. 
Agrawal, A. 2005: Environmentality: Technologies of government and the making of 
subjects. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 
Alford, R.R. and Friedland, R. 1985: Powers of theory: Capitalism, the state, and 
democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Allen, J. and Cochrane, A. 2010: Assemblages of state power: Topological shifts in 
the organization of government and politics. Antipode 42, 1071-89. 
Altvater, E. 1973: Some problems of state interventionism. Kapitalistate 1, 96-108 
and 2, 76-83. 
Avineri, S. 1972: Hegel’s theory of the modern state. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Avineri, S. 1973: Labour, alienation, and social classes in Hegel’s Realphilosophie. In 
O’Malley, J.J., Algozin, K.W., Kainz, H.P. and Rice, L.C., editors, The Legacy of 
Hegel, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 196-215. 
Badie, B. and Birnbaum, P. 1983: The sociology of the state. Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press.  
Berlin, I. 1978: Karl Marx. Fourth edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Bernstein, S. 2001: The compromise of liberal environmentalism. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Bobbio, N. and Bovero, M. 1979: Società e stato nella filosofía politica moderna: 
Modello giusnaturalistico e modello hegelo-marxiano. Milan: Il Saggiatore.   
Brand, U. 2010: Sustainable development and ecological modernization: The limits to 
a hegemonic policy knowledge. Innovation 23, 135-52. 
Brannstrom, C., Clarke, J. and Newport, M. 2004: Civil society participation in the 
decentralisation of Brazil's water resources: Assessing participation in three states. 
Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 25, 304-21. 
 17 
Brenner, N. 2004: New state spaces: Urban governance and the rescaling of 
statehood. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Chaskiel, P. 2005. De Rousseau à Marx: Les métamorphoses du peuple. Hermés 42, 
32-37. 
Clark, G.L. and Dear, M. 1984: State apparatus: Structures and language of 
legitimacy. Boston: George Allen and Unwind. 
Clarke, S., editor 1991: The state debate. London: Macmillan. 
Conca, K. 1993. Environmental change and the deep structure of world politics. In 
Lipschutz, R.D. and Conca, K., editors, The state and social power in global 
environmental politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 306-26. 
Conca, K. 2006: Governing water: Contentions transnational politics and global 
institution building. Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press. 
Cudworth, E., Hall, T. and McGovern, J. 2007: The modern state: Theories and 
ideologies. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Daly, H., editor 1973: Toward a steady-state economy. San Francisco: Freeman.  
Davidson, S. 2012: The insuperable imperative: A critique of the ecological 
modernizing state. Capitalism Nature Socialism 23, 31-50. 
Dobson, A. 1998: Justice and the environment: Conceptions of environmental 
sustainability and dimensions of social justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
Dryzek, J.S. and Lester, J.P. 1989: Alternative views of the environmental 
problematic. In Lester, J.P, editor, Environmental politics and policy: Theories 
and evidence, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 314-30.  
Eckersley, R. 1992: Environmentalism and political theory: Toward an ecocentric 
approach. London: UCL Press. 
Eckersley, R. 2004: The green state: Rethinking democracy and sovereignty. 
Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press. 
Ehrlich, P. 1968: The population bomb. New York: Ballantine.  
Engels, F. 1972: The origin of the family, private property and the state. London: 
Penguin. 
Fine, B. and Harris, L. 1979: Rereading Capital. London: Macmillan. 
Foucault, M. 1977: Discipline and punish. Harmondsworth: Penguin.  
Gandy, M. 1999: Rethinking the ecological leviathan: Environmental regulation in an 
age of risk. Global Environmental Change 9, 59-69. 
Gramsci, A. 1971: Selections from the prison notebooks. London: Laurence and 
Wishart. 
Hay, C. 2006: (What’s Marxist about) Marxist state theory. In Hay, C., Lister, M. and 
Marsh, D., editors, The state: Theories and issues, Houndmills: Palgrave-
Macmillan, 59-78. 
Hayward, T. 1998: Political theory and ecological values. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Healy, K. 2012: Sociology. In Goodin, R.E., Pettit, P. and Pogge, T., editors, A 
companion to contemporary political philosophy, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 88-
117. 
Hegel, G.W.F. 1964: Hegel’s political writings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hegel, G.W.F. 2008 [1821]: Outlines of the philosophy of right. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Holloway, J. and Picciotto, S., editors 1978: State and capital. London: Edward 
Arnold. 
Hurrell, A. 1994: A crisis of ecological viability? Global environmental change and 
the nation state, Political Studies 42, 146-65.  
 18 
Ioris, A.A.R. 2010: The political nexus between water and economics in Brazil: A 
critique of recent policy reforms. Review of Radical Political Economics 42, 231-
50. 
Ioris, A.A.R. 2012a: The neoliberalization of water in Lima, Peru. Political 
Geography 31, 266-78. 
Ioris, A.A.R. 2012b: Applying the strategic-relational approach to urban political 
ecology:  The water management problems of the Baixada Fluminense, Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil. Antipode 44, 122-50. 
Irwin, R. 2007: The neoliberal state, environmental pragmatism, and its discontents. 
Environmental Politics 16, 643-58. 
Jessop, B. 1977: Recent theories of the capitalist state. Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 1, 353-73. 
Jessop, B. 1982: The capitalist state: Marxist theories and methods. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Jones, M. 1998: Restructuring the local state: Economic governance or social 
regulation? Political Geography 17, 959-88. 
Kant, I. 1991: Kant’s political writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Knox, T.M., 1970: Hegel and Prussianism. In Kaufmann, W., editor, Hegel’s political 
philosophy, New York: Atherton Press, 13-29. 
Kuus, M. and Agnew, J. 2008: Theorizing the state geographically: Sovereignty, 
subjectivity, territoriality. In Cox, K.R., Low, M. and Robinson, J., editors, The 
SAGE handbook of political geography, Los Angeles: SAGE, 95-106. 
Lefebvre, H. 2008: Space, difference, everyday life. New York: Routledge. 
Lefebvre, H. 2009: State, space, world: Selected essays. Minneapolis, MN: University 
of Minnesota Press. 
Lenin, V. 1932: State and revolution. New York: International Publishers. 
Levine, N. 2009: Hegelian continuities in Marx. Critique 37, 345-70. 
Liefferink, D. 1996: Environment and the nation state. Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press.  
 
MacLeod, G. and Goodwin, M. 1999: Space, scale and state strategy: Rethinking 
urban and regional governance. Progress in Human Geography 23, 503-27. 
Macnair, M. 2006: Law and state as holes in Marxist theory. Critique 34, 211-36. 
Mandel, E. 1969: Marxist theory of the state. New York: Merit Publishers. 
Mann, M. 1984: The autonomous power of the state. European Journal of Sociology 
25, 185-213.  
Mann, G. 2009: Should political ecology be Marxist? A case for Gramsci’s historical 
materialism. Geoforum 40, 335–44. 
Marx, K. 1913: The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. Chicago: Charles H. 
Kerr and Company. 
Marx, K. 1970 [1843]: Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.    
Marx, K. 1975: Early writings. London: Penguin and New Left Review.  
Marx, K. 1981 [1894]. Capital: Volume III. London: Penguin. 
Marx, K. and Engels, F. 1974 [1845-1846]: The German ideology. London: Lawrence 
and Wishart. 
Mcguirk, P. and O'Neill, P. 2012. Critical geographies with the state: The problem of 
social vulnerability and the politics of engaged research. Antipode 44, 1374-94. 
Meadows, D., Meadows, D., Randers, J. and Behrens III, W. 1974: The limits to 
growth. London: Pan. 
 19 
Miliband, R. 1969: The state in capitalist society. Basic Books: New York.  
Mol, A.P.J. and Sonnenfeld, D.A., editors 2000: Ecological modernisation around the 
world: Perspectives and critical debates. London and New York: Routledge. 
Negri, A. 2011: Rereading Hegel. In Žižek, S., Crockett, C. and Davis, C., editors, 
Hegel and the Infinite: Religion, Politics, and Dialectic, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 31-46.  
Nuijten, M., Koster, M. and De Vries, P. 2012: Regimes of spatial ordering in Brazil: 
Neoliberalism, leftist populism and modernist aesthetics in slum upgrading in 
Recife. Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 33, 157-70. 
OECD. 2011: Water governance in OECD countries: A multi-level approach. OECD 
Studies on Water. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
Offe, C. 1984: Contradictions of the welfare state. London: Hutchinson.   
Ollman, B. 2003: Dance of the dialectic: Steps in Marx’s method. Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press. 
Paehlke, R. and Torgerson, D., editors 2005: Managing Leviathan: Environmental 
politics and the administrative state. Second edition. Broadview Press: Toronto. 
Painter, J. 2006: Prosaic geographies of stateness. Political Geography 25, 752-74 
Park, J., Conca, K. and Finger, M., editors 2008: The crisis of global environmental 
governance: Towards a new political economy of sustainability. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
Paterson, M., Doran, P. and Barry, J. 2006: Green theory. In Hay, C., Lister, M. and 
Marsh, D., editors, The state: Theories and issues, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 135-54. 
Peck, J. 2001: Neoliberalizing states: Thin policies/hard outcomes. Progress in 
Human Geography 25, 445-55. 
Plant, P. 1973: Hegel. London: George Allen and Unwind. 
Poggi, G. 1978: The development of the modern state: A sociological introduction. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
Poulantzas, N. 1967: Marxist political theory in Great Britain. New Left Review 43, 
57-74. 
Poulantzas, N. 1978: State, power, socialism. London and New York: Verso. 
Reyburn, H.A. 1921: The ethical theory of Hegel: A study of the Philosophy of Right. 
Oxford: Claredon Press. 
Robbins, P. 2008: The state in political ecology: A postcard to political geography 
from the field. In Cox, K.R., Low, M. and Robinson, J., editors, The SAGE 
handbook of political geography, Los Angeles: SAGE, 205-18. 
Silvey, R. 2010: Development geography: Politics and ‘the state’ under crisis. 
Progress in Human Geography 34, 828-34. 
Sneddon, C. and Fox, C. 2011: The Cold War, the US Bureau of Reclamation, and the 
technopolitics of river basin development, 1950-1970. Political Geography 30, 
450-60. 
Taylor, P.J. 1999: Places, spaces and Macy’s: Place-space tensions in the political 
geography of modernities. Progress in Human Geography 23, 7-26. 
Tickell, A. 2001: Progress in the geography of services II: Services, the state and the 
rearticulation of capitalism. Progress in Human Geography 25, 283-92. 
Trotta, W. 2009: O pensamento político de Hegel à luz de sua filosofia do direito. 
Revista de Sociologia Política, Curitiba 17, 9-31. 
van den Berg, A. 2003: The immanent utopia: From Marxism on the state to the state 
of Marxism. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers. 
 20 
Wells, D. 1981: Marxism and the modern state: An analysis of fetishism in capitalist 
society, Sussex: Harvester Press. 
Whitehead, M., Jones, R. and Jones, M. 2007: The nature of the state: Excavating the 
political ecologies of the modern state. Oxford Geographical and Environmental 
Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wood, E.M. 2002: The origin of capitalism: A longer view. London and New York: 
Verso. 
Žižek, S. 2011. Hegel’s century. In Žižek, S., Crockett, C. and Davis, C., editors, 
Hegel and the Infinite: Religion, Politics, and Dialectic, New York: Columbia 
University Press, ix-xi. 
